

Peace Depot & Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security

BRIEFING PAPER

A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ)

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1. What is a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone?

A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) is a concrete manifestation of international or regional efforts to limit nuclear weapons — the most destructive weaponry humankind has created. However, a NWFZ is meant to achieve more than this. The objectives of a NWFZ include not only limiting nuclear weapons, but also making a significant contribution to maintaining international peace and security in areas with varied historical backgrounds, some with long-standing disputes. In order to realize the objectives of ensuring regional security in this broader sense, NWFZs have been pursued, achieved and maintained. Currently, there are four NWFZs, each established and governed by an international treaty and named after the place associated with its negotiation.

As many as 113 nations have become parties to these treaties. If Antarctica, which is a kind of NWFZ, is also included, it means that 50% of the earth's land area, and nearly the entire land area of the South Hemisphere, have achieved the status of a NWFZ.¹ All existing NWFZs have three common characteristics:

1. They prohibit the development, testing, manufacture, production, possession, acquisition, stockpiling, and transportation (on land and inland waters) of nuclear weapons anywhere within the zone. (Non-proliferation and non-deployment of nuclear weapons)
2. They prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against nations and areas within the zone. (Negative Security Assurance - NSA)
3. They establish an on-going organization to ensure compliance with the treaty.

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Existing Nuclear Weapon Free-Zones

(See Map: *Nuclear Weapon Free-Zones (NWFZ): Models of Non-Military Security*, on the last page of this paper)

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty)

Signature: February 1967; Entry into force: April 1968

Originally, the title of the Treaty did not include "Caribbean," but it was revised in 1990. Tlatelolco is the location of the Foreign Ministry in Mexico City where the Treaty was signed.

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)

Signature: August 1985; Entry into force: December 1986

Rarotonga is the capital of the Cook Islands where the Treaty was signed.

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone (Bangkok Treaty)

Signature: December 1995; Entry into force: March 1997

Bangkok (Thailand) is the city where the Treaty was signed.

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

Signature: April 1996 (Cairo); Not yet in force
Pelindaba is the location in South Africa where the final stages of the treaty were negotiated.

The second characteristic of NWFZs noted above is especially significant. When NWFZs are advocated, there is a tendency to associate them solely with non-nuclear weapon states' obligations related to non-proliferation and non-deployment of nuclear weapons as stated in 1 above. However, all existing NWFZ treaties have protocols requiring nuclear weapon states to provide NSAs as mentioned in 2 above. For example, the

Tlatelolco Treaty (Section 2 of Protocol 2) stipulates a NSA, and with Russia's (former Soviet Union) ratification in 1979, all nuclear weapon states completed ratification of this protocol.

The Rarotonga Treaty (Section 1 of Protocol 2) also secures a NSA which both Russia and China ratified in 1988 and 1989 respectively. The Western nuclear weapon states have also finally signed the protocols after France ended its nuclear testing program in March 1996. At present, all nuclear weapon states except the United States have completed ratification of the Treaty.

Both the Bangkok Treaty (Section 2) and the Pelindaba Treaty (Section 1 of Protocol 1) request provision of an NSA by the nuclear weapon states. As yet, not a single nuclear weapon state has signed the Protocol of the Bangkok Treaty, whereas all nuclear weapon states have signed the Protocol of the Pelindaba Treaty; and, China, France and the United Kingdom have also ratified it.

When an NSA by all nuclear weapon states enters into force, nations within the NWFZ are essentially placed under a legally binding "Non-Nuclear Umbrella."

Mechanisms for verification and consultation have been established to guarantee compliance with the obligations imposed by existing NWFZ treaties. They are the: "Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean Latin America Nuclear Prohibition Organization (OPANAL)," "(South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty) Consultative Committee," "Commission for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone," and "The African Commission on Nuclear Energy."

2. Comparison of Existing NWFZs

There is an almost 30-year interval between the Tlatelolco Treaty, negotiated in the 1960s during the Cold War, and the Bangkok and Pelindaba Treaties, concluded after the end of the Cold War, close to the time of the conclusion of CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) negotiations. The four NWFZ treaties exhibit a clear evolution of concerns consistent with the era in which each was established. The main points of this evolution are summarized as follows:

(a) Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)

The Tlatelolco Treaty permits explosions of nuclear devices for non-weaponry purposes (such as civil engineering projects) under certain conditions. However, since entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970, which bans PNEs, subsequent NWFZ treaties have prohibited this activity.

(b) Port calls and transit by warships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons

At the time of the establishment of the Tlatelolco Treaty, the issue of transit and portcalls by warships carrying nuclear weapons did not garner attention and thus, no special provisions were included in the Treaty. However, the issue became extremely hot and politically sensitive during the Rarotonga Treaty negotiations. The nuclear weapon states adhered to the NCND policy (that is, neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons), while allies of nuclear weapon states adopted a policy of extended deterrence. Because of this, a universal prohibition on such portcalls was not achieved in later treaties. The matter is left to the discretion of each party to the treaties. (See Article 5 of the Rarotonga Treaty; Article 7 of the Bangkok Treaty and Article 4 of the Pelindaba Treaty.)²

(c) Dumping of radioactive waste

Although the Tlatelolco Treaty has no provision prohibiting the dumping of radioactive waste, subsequent NWFZ treaties do prohibit the dumping of radioactive waste at sea. For example, the Bangkok Treaty prohibits not only such dumping at sea, but also discharge into the atmosphere and disposition on land outside the territory of each nation. The Pelindaba Treaty prohibits import, trans-boundary movement, and dumping of radioactive waste.

(d) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

Each treaty has its own particular method of defining its geographical zone of application. The Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties set their zones of application to include an expanse of international water in addition to the territory and territorial waters of countries within the zone. The Bangkok Treaty applies to the EEZ as well as to the territories and territorial waters of the state parties within the zone. The Pelindaba Treaty applies to the territories and territorial waters of the state parties within the zone.

(e) Armed attack on nuclear installations


The Pelindaba Treaty promotes mutual cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy by stipulating that, "Each Party undertakes not to take, or assist, or encourage any action aimed at an armed attack by conventional or other means against nuclear installations..." (Article 11) It is the only NWFZ treaty to have such a provision.

3. Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ): The History

A number of substantial arguments in favor of the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia have appeared in the post-Cold War era. Some of these are summarized as follows. (Also see the Appendix.) In March 1995, after several years of collaborative work, a senior panel led by John Endicott (Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy (CISTP), Georgia Institute of Technology), presented a proposal for a Limited Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia (LNEA-NWFZ).³ At that time, the panel held a press conference to announce its work in Washington DC. In Japan, the panel's proposal was introduced in an article in the *Asahi Shinbun* (June 1995).⁴ A more detailed description of the activities of the Endicott group was later reported in 1999.⁵ According to that account, even though the group initiated its research activities in 1991, those activities were more informal and of an internal nature, being accomplished by exchanges of ideas among individuals.

This first proposal for a NEA-NWFZ entailed the concept of a circular zone, consisting of a circular area with a 2000-kilometer radius from a center point at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula. The proposed zone would consist of the entirety of the ROK (Republic of Korea - South Korea), DPRK (Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea - North Korea), Japan, and Taiwan and also include some portions of China, Russia and Mongolia. The United States, which maintains military bases in Japan and the ROK, would also be included as a relevant party to the treaty (See Map 1). In the expert meeting with five participants from the US, Russia, China, Japan and the ROK, this proposal was finally agreed upon but with a limitation that, "certain categories (of nuclear weapons) be excluded from inclusion during the initial stages of the Agreement, and that emphasis be placed on nuclear warheads applicable to non-strategic missiles and other nuclear warheads or devices with 'tactical' applications."⁶ In other words, this proposal comprises a Limited Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone (LNWFZ) because it is applicable to non-strategic nuclear weapons only. Also, the group extended the geographical area of the proposal to an elliptical one (the shape of American football) with its major axis extending to part of Alaska, in the belief that a portion of US territory should be included in the NWFZ (See Map 2).

A similar circular arrangement was proposed independently by Kumao Kaneko (former professor at Tokai University, former director of the Nuclear Energy Division of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a Japanese diplomat).⁷ His proposal differs from the LNWFZ described above. It is a comprehensive circu-




MAP 1: A Circular Zone

lar NWFZ, based on the idea that the obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states within the zone would differ from each other, with the nuclear weapon states being required to eliminate their nuclear weapons within the zone on a step-by-step basis.

Meanwhile, Andrew Mack (former Director of the Department of International Relations, Australia National University) suggested that, "Perhaps the most obvious NEANFZ would be one which encompassed the two Koreas, Japan and Taiwan."⁸ Although Taiwan is not a "country," it is a member of APEC, and thus, it could justifiably qualify to be a part of the area constituting the NEA-NWFZ. Mack's paper appeared as a chapter of an UNIDIR report, of which he was an editor. The study was innovative, but notably did not refer to the research led by Endicott, suggesting that there may have been little exchange of information on this subject among researchers in those days.

While welcoming both the circular and elliptical NWFZ proposals, I have proposed what I believe is a more realistic geographical arrangement for a NEA-NWFZ. Entitled the "Three-Plus-Three Arrangement," the proposal takes into consideration the history of Northeast Asia and the urgent circumstances of its current situation.⁹ It proposes the conclusion of a trilateral NWFZ treaty among the core nations of Japan, the ROK, and the DPRK with protocols providing for negative security assurances (NSAs) from the surrounding three nuclear weapon states — the United States, China, and Russia (See Map 3). According to recent discussions among experts in Japan, it may be preferable to incorporate an NSA provision into the main text of the treaty rather than into a protocol. In this case, the treaty will be a six-party treaty with different obligations between the former three and latter three parties.

**MAP 2: Limited Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone
in Northeast Asia
(Notional)**



Areas Involved:

- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| North Korea | South Korea |
| United States of America | Russia |
| Peoples Republic of China | Taiwan (ROC) |
| Mongolia | Japan |

This approach could be pursued by taking advantage of the existing declared policies of the three key states. Specifically, the ROK and the DPRK have signed the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (January 20, 1992), in which they agreed to “refrain from the testing, manufacture, production, acceptance, possession, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear weapons,” and to “use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes.” It is conceded that there have been various problems with these positions since they were announced; nevertheless, they do remain their declared positions currently on record. In addition, Japan has its “three non-nuclear principles,” which state that Japan will not manufacture, possess, nor allow the bringing-in of nuclear weapons. Also, Japan’s 1995 Atomic Energy Basic Law prohibits use of nuclear energy for military purposes.

While pursuing Track II efforts to develop its LNWFZ initiative, the Endicott group came to the realization that the establishment of the circular or elliptical NWFZ would be extremely difficult, even if it were limited to non-strategic nuclear weapons. In such circumstances in which “little progress was likely on the

major issues.”¹⁰ toward the LNWFZ, the group suggested a new proposal as an interim step to overcome these difficulties. They proposed a first phase of the LNWFZ which would include, “Japan, the ROK, possibly Mongolia, and if its non-nuclear status is clarified, the DPRK”¹¹. The proposal is very similar to the “Three Plus Three” scenario that I have suggested.

Following the developments of these concepts, it would be safe to say that today there is a general agreement on an approach to establishing a NEA-NWFZ which would consist of the ROK, DPRK, and Japan as the key components, and possibly Mongolia and Taiwan as well. A recent article in the *Asahi Shinbun* reports that, “Recently there is a prevailing view that the declared non-nuclear weapon states in the region should constitute the core of a NEA-NWFZ, as suggested by Umebayashi.”¹²

4. Significance of a Northeast Asia NWFZ

The undertaking to establish a NEA-NWFZ has great significance in that it will entail the reorganization of the current security arrangement in the region. The government of Japan (GOJ), along with Japan’s ruling establishment, has recently been using manipulated information and relying on the logic of the US-led War on Terror, while emphasizing the threat against Japan in the region. The peace movement in Japan has been facing new challenges as a result of the expanded projection of Japanese military power provided for in the renewed “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997),” “The Law Concerning Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (1997),” “Joint Research on TMD (theater missile defense) Technologies (1998),” “The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (2001),” “The Laws Concerning Armed Attack Situations (2003),” and “The Law for Special Measures to Support Iraqi Restoration (2003).” The peace movement must respond to this situation by resisting the GOJ’s dangerous propaganda that emphasizes the need to strengthen Japan’s military systems and capabilities. At the same time, it must develop proactive approaches to ease tension in Northeast Asia and create alternative plans to build peace through confidence building measures.

The establishment of a NEA-NWFZ can be considered a concrete example among such alternatives. Assuming this new perspective can be communicated persuasively, it could be expected to have great appeal to the public.

If someone were to ask me, “What is an alternative to the New Defense Guidelines, taking the Northeast Asia situation into consideration?” I would have no hesitation in replying, “It is to establish a NEA-NWFZ.”

Some may argue that a military response and a NWFZ are not comparable, that they are “apples and oranges.” I believe this is not the case. “In fact, both are meant to be practical solutions towards a common end — to ensure the peace and security of the people living in Northeast Asia. In other words, they are contrasting approaches to security in Northeast Asia. The difference between them is that one considers security from the traditional perspective — ‘security by arms’, while the other considers security from a new perspective — ‘common security’ or ‘democratization of security.’”¹³

A NEA-NWFZ, even if it entails only the three elements noted in Section 1, would make a significant contribution to confidence building and easing of tensions in the region as described below:


(a) From the Korean Peninsula’s point of view, Japan’s suspected nuclear weapons’ development would be able to be verified by means of the NWFZ’s verification measures. From the Japanese point of view, the DPRK’s suspected nuclear development would also be able to be verified in a similar manner. By means of such verification measures, the rise of Japanese pro-nuclear rightists and ROK’s supporters for “nuclear sovereignty,” which is reinforced by mutual suspicion toward each other, could be prevented.

(b) The GOJ has identified distrust toward China as part of its rationale for Japan’s military buildup. In particular, it distrusts China’s unilateral security assurance, a key component of Chinese nuclear policy, which states that China will not attack non-nuclear states with nuclear weapons under any circumstances. A NWFZ could make this security assurance legally binding. Similarly, Japan’s concerns about Russia’s nuclear weapons could be solved by a legally binding NSA from Russia. From the DPRK’s point of view, formal assurances by the US “against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US,” as stipulated in the 1994 Agreed Framework, would become legally binding. Such security assurances will serve as the foundation for further disarmament in the region.

(c) Although prohibition against chemical and biological weapons would not be directly included in a NWFZ, the subject would naturally be on the table in NWFZ negotiations. Unlike the situation for nuclear weapons, international treaties already exist which prohibit chemical and biological weapons, and a NWFZ would necessarily be discussed in relation to these treaties. It would be possible to refer to CB weapons in some way in a NWFZ treaty.

(d) More generally, the mechanism established in the treaty for ensuring compliance of state parties is expected to serve as a venue where a wide range of security issues can be discussed. In order to prevent the deep-rooted distrust originating from Japanese colonial rule and the absence of a formal apology in the post-WWII era from developing into an unfortunate military conflict in the future, a highly transparent venue for consultation should be established. The mechanism for ensuring the compliance with the treaty could serve as the first step of such an arrangement. Its establishment would also signal the transformation from an obsolete security structure dependent upon US military forces to a new cooperative regional security framework.

**MAP 3: Three-Plus-Three Arrangement:
A Six-Party Treaty or a Three-Party Treaty,
involving Japan, ROK & DPRK with Non-
Nuclear Commitments, and USA, Russia and
China with Negative Security Assurances**



5. Important Issues

In the previous section, I have discussed the great benefits that the establishment of even the most “conservative” NWFZ would bring about. In this section, I will identify a few issues specifically related to Northeast Asia. These items are compiled from papers I presented at the NWFZ International Seminar, Uppsala, Sweden, in September 2000 and subsequent international conferences.¹⁴

(a) **Plutonium**

The 1994 “Agreed Framework” between the US and the DPRK requires the DPRK to implement the “1992 North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization

of the Korean Peninsula.” Even if the 1994 Agreed Framework is discarded and a new agreement is reached, it is very probable that the “1992 Joint Declaration” would remain the basis for the new agreement. Under this “Joint Declaration,” both Koreas are prohibited from possessing nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. However, North and South Korea would be cautious about the “Joint Declaration” becoming legally binding should Japan’s enormous plutonium capability be left intact. For this reason, a NWFZ in this region must include Japan. One of the important benefits of a NEA-NWFZ is that Japan and two Koreas would be under a single verification system.

(b) Reliance on Nuclear Weapons in Security Policy

To become a state party to a NWFZ is not necessarily the same as abandoning a security policy dependent on nuclear weapons. For example, it is logically possible for Japan to maintain its reliance on US nuclear deterrence, while at the same time joining the NWFZ framework. However, since the possibility of nuclear attacks against Japan would be eliminated as a result of legally binding security assurances of a NWFZ, US nuclear deterrence would then assume a retaliatory role with the use of nuclear weapons against possible non-nuclear attacks. In other words, a policy reliant on nuclear deterrence could persist under a NWFZ, but it would apply to nuclear weapons’ use solely against non-nuclear weapons.

Although the persistence of nuclear deterrence is logically possible under a NWFZ, it must be emphasized that all nations agreed to “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies” at the 2000 Review Conference of NPT. The policy to use nuclear weapons solely against non-nuclear weapon attacks, as mentioned above, would constitute a clear violation of the NPT agreement because it entails an obvious expansion of the role of nuclear weapons. Therefore, a new NWFZ treaty must include a provision stipulating that non-nuclear weapon state parties commit to abandoning reliance upon nuclear weapons in every aspect of their security policies.

(c) Portcalls and Transit by Nuclear Weapon-carrying Warships

As was discussed in Section 2, all existing NWFZs leave the prohibition of portcalls and transit of territorial water by nuclear weapon-carrying vessels to the discretion of each party to the treaty; thus, there is no universality to the prohibition. However, in response to overwhelming public opinion, Japan has committed to banning both portcalls and transit by nuclear weapon-carrying vessels, relying upon its three non-nuclear principles as the basis for this policy. It is noted that

although official documents suggesting the existence of secret accords between Washington and Tokyo have been repeatedly disclosed, the GOJ has denied their existence. Therefore, on the optimistic side, a NEA-NWFZ could be the first NWFZ that prohibits portcalls and transit of territorial water by nuclear weapon-carrying vessels. On the pessimistic side, the GOJ may continue to show strong resistance to even the mere idea of any negotiation of a NEA-NWFZ in order to observe secret accords with the US and in the process, continue to deceive its people.

(d) Obligation for Anti-Nuclear-Weapon Education

A NEA-NWFZ would be unique in that it would be the first NWFZ established that actually is home to a large number of victims of nuclear weapon attacks. The victims of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings live not only in Japan, but also on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, a distinctive element could be incorporated into a NEA-NWFZ that contributes to global nuclear disarmament by stipulating state parties’ obligation to educate citizens all over the world about the realities of the physical and social suffering of these victims.

(e) Prohibition of armed attack on nuclear power plants

Regardless of the arguments for and against nuclear power, a NEA-NWFZ would need to acknowledge the reality of the many nuclear power stations currently in operation; therefore, it would be necessary to include provisions to prohibit any deliberate armed attack on nuclear power plants, attacks that would result in enormous damage to citizens.

6. Conclusion

The political and diplomatic path to realize the proposed NEA-NWFZ is necessarily affected by a host of variables. It is desirable to seize the opportunity to establish the NEA-NWFZ, while at the same time, carefully observing the development of various ongoing processes in the region, such as inter-Korean talks, Japan-DPRK normalization talks, and other multilateral talks, such as the current Six-Party talks process, which involves the same six countries that would be party to the “Three Plus Three Nations Arrangement” of a NEA-NWFZ.

In addition, in terms of the process to establish a NWFZ in the region, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the sole Asia-Pacific regional multilateral forum devoted exclusively to security issues, should be recognized as having the potential of becoming a significant forum for negotiation of this subject. Since its establishment in 1994, the ARF has been actively discussing the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula, and all states potentially concerned with a NEA-NWFZ, including the DPRK, are members of the ARF.

Regardless of the process undertaken, there is no doubt that civil society in its pursuit of “human security” will play a critical role in advancing frameworks for co-operative security beyond national borders. Future objectives for peace NGOs in the region will necessarily include:

1. Strengthening concerted NGO efforts in the ROK and Japan with the common goal of:

“Not a War, a NWFZ Instead”

2. Mobilizing parliamentarians in both countries to take actions to realize a NEA-NWFZ.

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ENDNOTES:

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5. John E. Endicott & Alan G. Gorowitz, “Track II Cooperative Regional Security Efforts: Lessons from the Limited Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone for Northeast Asia,” Pacifica Review, Volume 11 #3, October 1999.
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13. Hiromichi Umabayashi, “ajia beigum to shin gaidorain (U.S. Military Forces in Asia and New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation),” Iwanami Booklet, No.463, October 20 1998.
14. Hiromichi Umabayashi, “High Time for the NGO Cooperation in the Region: Status Report on Efforts for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” NWFZ International Seminar, Uppsala, Sweden, 1-4 Sept 2000. Also “Supplemental Memo on a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” Strategic Peace and International Affairs Research Institute, Tokai University Symposium, Tokyo, October 3, 2000.

Appendix
**Proposals for a Northeast Asia
 Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone**

CHRONOLGY

March 1995	Endicott, et. al., Circular and Elliptical Limited Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (LNWFZ) ^{5,6}
1995	Andrew Mack, NWFZ involving the ROK, DPRK, Japan and Taiwan ⁸
March 1996	Kumao Kaneko, Circular NWFZ ⁷
May 1996	Hiromichi Umabayashi, Three Plus Three Nations Arrangement involving the ROK, DPRK, Japan ⁹
October 1997	Endicott, et al., NEA League of Non-Nuclear States, involving the ROK, Japan and Mongolia as a Phase I formation of the NEA-LNWFZ ¹¹

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Nuclear Weapon Free-Zones (NWFZ)

Models of Non-Military Security

Expand NWFZs into the Northern Hemisphere!

Almost all the land area and two-thirds of the sea in the Southern Hemisphere have been designated as NWFZs. It is important to note that a NWFZ is not only a zone in which no nuclear weapons exist, but also a zone in which the threat or use of nuclear weapons is prohibited. In other words, a NWFZ provides a "non-nuclear umbrella" by prohibiting any nuclear attacks. It embodies the concept of non-military security. Such a concept challenges the idea of security based on military power, currently exemplified by Japan's and South Korea's continued reliance on the U.S. "Nuclear Umbrella."

Central Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty has not yet been concluded)

* COUNTRIES AND AREAS LOCATED WITHIN THE ZONE
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

* In 1997, establishment of a NWFZ in the region was officially agreed by the above 5 countries. On September 27, 2002, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, 5 countries agreed on the text of a treaty establishing a Central Asian NWFZ.

Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status

* On December 4, 1998, nuclear-weapon-free status (NWFS) for Mongolia was internationally recognized by the adoption of UNGA resolution.

* February 3, 2000, the Mongolian Parliament adopted legislation defining and institutionalizing the NWFS at the national level.

* Mongolia has been pursuing bilateral or multilateral agreements based on its NWFS.

Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (non-governmental proposals)

Since the mid-1990's, a number of substantial non-governmental proposals for a Northeast Asia NWFZ have been put forward. The most viable of these proposals is the "Three-plus-Three Nations Arrangement," which takes advantages of the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" (1992), and the Japanese "three non-nuclear principles." This scheme proposes to conclude a six-party or a three-party treaty in which Japan, the ROK and the DPRK commit to remain non-nuclear states with the US, China and Russia providing negative security assurances to them.

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

* SIGNATURE:
April 1996 (Cairo)

* ENTRY INTO FORCE
Not yet in force (The Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the twenty-eighth instrument of ratification.)


* ZONE OF APPLICATION
The land territories and the territorial seas of the continent of Africa, islands States members of the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU)* and all islands considered by the OAU in its resolution to be part of Africa. (The map at the right is rendered consistent with Annex I of the Treaty except for small islands which are not shown.) (note) The map in Annex I makes note of the territorial dispute concerning the Chagos Archipelago. The island of Diego Garcia, where U.S. military forces are based, is located in the Archipelago.

* COUNTRIES AND AREAS LOCATED WITHIN THE ZONE
Agalega Islands, Algeria, Angola, Bassas da India, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canary Islands, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chagos Islands, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Eurpa Island, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Juan de Nova, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Prince Edward-Marion Islands, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Reunion, Rodrigues Island, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Tromelin Island, Western Sahara, Uganda, Cape Verde Islands, Zambia, Zanzibar, Zimbabwe. (Names above are based on Annex of the Treaty except some changes in names of countries)

* PARTIES TO THE TREATY
50 Nations have signed; 19 nations have signed and ratified: Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo and Zimbabwe.

* RESPONSES OF THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES
Protocol I prohibits use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the contracting parties to the Treaty. Protocol II prohibits the testing of nuclear explosive devices anywhere within the zone and asks all declared nuclear weapon states to accede to it. China, France and UK have signed and ratified the Protocols. The US and Russia have signed the Protocols.

* In July 2002, OAU has announced its decision to change from OAU to African Union (AU).



Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone (Bangkok Treaty)

* SIGNATURE:
December 15, 1995

* ENTRY INTO FORCE
March 27, 1997

* ZONE OF APPLICATION
Territories, continental shelves and exclusive economic zones of all states in Southeast Asia (In the map above, the 200-sea-miles exclusive economic zone is shown.)

* COUNTRIES AND AREAS LOCATED WITHIN THE ZONE
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam (note) Many of the Spratly Islands, subject to territorial claims by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei are located within this zone.

* PARTIES TO THE TREATY
All countries listed in COUNTRIES AND AREAS WITHIN THE ZONE have already signed and ratified.

* RESPONSES OF THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES
The Treaty asks all the declared nuclear-weapon states to accede to the Protocol which prohibits their use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the contracting parties to the Treaty or within the zone (Art. 2). Because it prohibits the use of nuclear weapons without prior consultation and it includes exclusive economic zones as part of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, the US has refused to sign the Protocol. China has also expressed reservations about the Treaty.

Prepared by:
The Peace Depot (Japan) &
Pacific Campaign for
Disarmament & Security
(April 2004)

Antarctic Treaty

* SIGNATURE
December 1, 1959 (Washington, D.C.)

* ENTRY INTO FORCE
June 23, 1961

* ZONE OF APPLICATION
The geographical area south of the latitude 60° but does not limit the rights of any state under international law with regard to the high seas.

* COUNTRIES AND AREAS LOCATED WITHIN THE ZONE
None. The territorial claims in Antarctica are frozen.

* PARTIES TO THE TREATY
44 parties, including all declared nuclear-weapon states.

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)

* SIGNATURE
August 6, 1985

* ENTRY INTO FORCE
December 11, 1986

* ZONE OF APPLICATION
Annex I of the Treaty prescribes its zone by latitude and longitude in detail. The map above is consistent with the map attached to the Treaty. Portions of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone that abut the Indian Ocean are limited by Australian territorial waters. Australian islands in the Indian Ocean that are also parts of the Nuclear Free Zone are not shown on the map.

* COUNTRIES AND AREAS LOCATED WITHIN THE ZONE
Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Samoa, Cook Islands (NZ), Niue (NZ) (note) Colonial French Polynesia, American Samoa, New Caledonia (France) are also included within the zone. The Treaty is open to the members of the South Pacific Forum, therefore the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty)

* SIGNATURE
February 14, 1967

* ENTRY INTO FORCE
April 22, 1968

* ZONE OF APPLICATION
Starting at a point located at 35° north latitude, 75° west longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point 30° north latitude, 50° west longitude; from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 5° north latitude; from there, directly southward to a point at 60° south latitude, 115° west longitude; from there, directly northward to a point at 0° latitude, 150° west longitude; from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 35° north latitude, 150° west longitude; from there directly eastward to a point at 35° north latitude, 75° west longitude (except the continental part of the territory of the United States of America and its territorial waters).

* COUNTRIES AND AREAS LOCATED WITHIN THE ZONE
Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Christopher-Nevis, Saint Vincent-Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, (note) Colonial Islands such as Puerto Rico (US Commonwealth) and the Falkland Islands (UK Colony) are also located in the area.

* PARTIES TO THE TREATY
33 countries that are listed above as COUNTRIES AND AREAS WITHIN THE ZONE have signed and ratified.

* RESPONSES OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES
All the declared nuclear-weapon states signed the Additional Protocol II which prohibits their use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the contracting parties of the Treaty.

Micronesia have the right to accede to the treaty, even though they are located outside the zone.

* PARTIES TO THE TREATY
12 countries that are listed above as COUNTRIES AND AREAS LOCATED WITHIN THE ZONE except for Tonga (signed), have ratified.

* RESPONSES OF THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES
Protocol 2 and 3 prohibit use or threat of use of any nuclear explosive devices and the testing of any nuclear explosive devices anywhere within the zone. The US, UK and France signed after the termination of nuclear testing by France and as of now, all nuclear weapon states except the U.S. have ratified the Protocols.