Information Update #61 (March 2003)
North Korea's Nuclear "Bombshell"
& A Non-Governmental Response
| Editor's Note: Information Update (IU) #61 is being issued as the United States leads a preemptive military attack on Iraq. North Korea, one of the members of the so-called "axis of evil," cannot help but wonder if it too will soon find itself in the cross-hairs of the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy. At the beginning of March, the Baltimore Sun quoted President Bush as saying: "If they [North Koreans] don't work diplomatically, they'll have to work militarily." This IU presents background on an issue that we expect will be front and center in the months to come. |
On October 16, 2002, the United States announced that the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK - North Korea) admitted it has undertaken a nuclear
weapons development program. If the DPRK has embarked on this activity, it would
appear to be in violation of four international agreements -- Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); 1992 Joint North-South Declaration
on the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; 1992 Safeguards Agreement
Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea; and, the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework. Subsequently, on January 10, 2003, the DPRK declared its withdrawal from the
NPT saying, "Though we pull out of the NPT, we have no intention of producing
nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only
to peaceful purposes." North Korea's declaration to withdraw from the NPT has
changed the political landscape of Northeast Asia, retarding North Korea's
recent tentative efforts to find its place in world affairs as represented by
the September 2002 breakthrough summit between the leaders of Japan and North
Korea.
Initial international response to North Korea's revelation in October was
measured, calling on North Korea to abandon its program and conclude a
diplomatic resolution of the issue. For its part, North Korea claimed
willingness to address US security concerns about its nuclear weapons program
through dialogue, proposing three conditions for peaceful settlement: 1) US
recognition of North Korea's sovereignty; 2) US assurance of non-aggression
towards North Korea; and, 3) a halt to US interference and hindrance in North
Korea's economic development. The US turned down the proposal, insisting that
North Korea scrap its nuclear program in an "immediate and verifiable" way.
Among possible explanations for what some call North Korea's new
"confessional diplomacy" is its concern over the glacial pace of negotiations
with the Bush administration to normalize their relations in the context of the
1994 Agreed Framework. In that agreement, North Korea committed to freeze and
eventually dismantle some of its facilities that are alleged to be for a nuclear
arms program in exchange for fuel oil and proliferation-resistant nuclear
reactors from among others, the US, Japan, and South Korea. For some time, the
DPRK had been complaining about the protracted time that it was taking for the
US to fulfill its obligations under the Agreed Framework. For example, the
nuclear reactors to be built by US-led KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization), which were to be completed in 2002, were not expected to be ready
for several years past the target date. In addition, Pyongyang was concerned
about delays in the delivery of heavy oil and that the United States had not
fully lifted economic sanctions.
The difficulties in implementing the Agreed Framework have been compounded by
the Bush Administration's harsh "axis of evil" rhetoric and doctrine of
preemption. This new doctrine entails the right to use military force against
"rogue" regimes seeking weapons of mass destruction before those regimes can
attack the United States. Inevitably, Pyongyang interprets this as a US threat
of nuclear "first-use" on the Korean Peninsula.
Among other possible explanations for North Korea's actions and admission is
that, "...Pyongyang concluded that securing nuclear weapons was necessary not
only to ensure its survival, but also as indispensable leverage in dealing with
outside powers, especially the United States." (note:1) Alexandre Y. Mansourov
suggests that, "In one big swing, Kim Jong-Il raised dramatically the stakes of
nuclear bargaining with the United States...Kim Jong-Il chose to reveal one of
his winning cards, previously tightly held, not only to deter the main
adversary, but also to entice the latter into meaningful and credible
negotiations over the entire spectrum of bilateral relations." (note:2)
By early November, tensions over the issue had intensified. North Korea
proclaimed: "Reckless political, economic and military pressure from the Bush
Administration is seriously threatening our right to subsistence creating a
grave situation on the Korean peninsula. We told the special envoy of the US
president that we are entitled to possess not only nuclear weapons but any type
of weapon more powerful than that in order to protect our sovereignty and right
to subsistence from an ever growing US nuclear threat." (note:3)
~Agreed Framework~The Agreed Framework "is useful in realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula...China hopes the relevant parties can carry out their obligations." [Kong Quan, PRC Foreign Ministry, AP 11/21/02] |
As discord heightened, the perennially sensitive subject of joint Japan-US
missile defense was added to the mix with US Undersecretary of Defense Douglas
Feith warning that Japan faces the "danger" of a DPRK missile attack. Although
claiming not to be pressuring Japan to build a missile shield, the US has
intensified its efforts to build a multilayered Missile Defense (MD) which
integrates previous Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense
(NMD), with an aim to eventually integrating its Asian allies into the program.
Although he denies making such comments, Japan's Defense Agency Chief Shigeru
Ishiba expressed hopes that Japan will soon move from the research to the
development phase of the bilateral missile defense initiative with the US. His
sentiments were echoed by a senior aide to Prime Minister Koizumi, Deputy
Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, who said that to counter the threat of an
"unpredictable" DPRK, it was only natural for Japan to consider a missile
defense system as it currently had no means to protect itself from a missile
attack. Abe's notion does not reflect the reality of the region. A more accurate
description of the situation is that, in fact, North Korea and China have long
been exposed to an overwhelming threat of offensive theatre missiles. North
Korea has responded to any US-Japan efforts to develop MD by threatening to end
its three-year- old missile test moratorium. Such a move would undermine the
important pledge Kim Jong-Il made to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
at their historic summit in September 2002 to extend the moratorium, originally
set to end in 2003. Some analysts suggest that the Bush Administration may not,
in fact, be interested in removing North Korea from the threat list. Perception
of such a threat may provide a good justification for building a MD system, the
real goal of which includes countering any threat from China, the one country
developing sufficient economic and military status to challenge the United
States.
Excerpts from:
A Maginot Line in the Sky: International Perspectives on Ballistic Missile Defense
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2001
[*Since the publication of the following, the terms TMD (Theater Missile Defense) and NMD (National Missile Defense) have been subsumed under the more comprehensive MD, which refers to a multilayered Missile Defense.]"The notion that NTWD (Navy Theater Wide Defense) is purely defensive is also related to a lack of regional perspective. The fair description of the situation is that it is North Korea and China that have long been exposed to an overwhelming threat of offensive theater (intermediate range) missiles posed by the US-Japan military alliance. In Yokosuka, Japan, as many as 500 vertical launchers of Tomahawk cruise missiles are aboard six US naval warships homeported at the Yokosuka US Naval Base. It is assumed that about half of those launchers are fitted with cruise missiles, ready to fly with pinpoint accuracy. Adding the TMD system to such a situation could never be viewed as a defensive step. It appears to be an action for ultimate offensive dominance. [Hiro Umebayashi, "Theater Missile Defense: A Confidence Destructive Measure in East Asia"]
"...the American vision of NMD and TMD in this region will tend to give the general public an illusion that the nuclear threat to humanity can be effectively nullified without eliminating the nuclear weapons themselves. This promotion of a false sense of security, which may be catering to the latent popular greed for self-centered security systems, will act against the possibility of building a genuine nuclear free zone in Northeast Asia. The missile defenses will not function - as some politicians might expect in the US and Japan - as reasons not to worry about the nuclear weapons of China and Russia. They will function as reason not to care about the necessity of building a system of common security with the other powers, involving an effort to create nuclear weapon free zones around the world. Building a nuclear weapon free zone requires a political environment favorable to explore a common security system among potentially hostile nations in the region. TMD and NMD will destroy any semblance of that kind of political trust among nations...A real process of building a nuclear weapon free zone in East Asia requires the commitment of American allies in East Asia to liberating themselves from dependence on US military power and the technology of missile defense which will remain permanently imperfect...The idea of a NWFZ should be presented as the real alternative to building dangerous and imperfect missile defense system." [Samsung Lee, "Missile Defenses and the Korean Peninsula" ]
Citizen Groups to Send Delegation to North Korea
to Propose a
Non-Nuclear Treaty
The Peace Depot and Peace Boat are well-prepared for this eventual mission. In particular, the Peace Depot has been granted funds from the Toyota Foundation to study "Northeast Asia Regional Security Frameworks" and is currently working on a draft Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty along with educational activities to promote the idea among the general public. For its part, the Peace Boat has organized five cruises to North Korea since the 1990s for citizen exchanges with two thousand citizens having already participated. The groups also request that both the Japanese and North Korean governments place the subject of a NWFZ on the negotiating table for future talks between the two countries, while at the same time the groups call on the United States to abandon its own nuclear programs and its hostile policy toward North Korea. The groups have issued a joint declaration outlining their position as follows:
November 7, 2002
Bringing a 'Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone' to the Negotiating Table
1. That North Korea make public all information regarding its programme of nuclear weapons development. If North Korea's nuclear weapons development programme is a fact, then this clearly goes against major international agreements such as the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework, and the 1992 Joint Declaration on the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We strongly protest this act as wrecking the security base of the Northeast Asia region. In order to establish the truth of the matter and at what stage the programme stands, a thorough investigation must be made. First and foremost we demand that the North Korean government make public all information related to the programme immediately.2. That the U.S. should revoke its hostile policy against North Korea. At the same time, we must draw attention to the numerous infringements of international agreements committed by the U.S. The most important point to consider is that President Bush has unilaterally trampled upon the agreement reached in October 2000 that 'neither government would have hostile intent toward the other' and that 'both governments [are committed] to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity.' Through the 'axis of evil' statement, the Nuclear Posture Review and its National Security Strategy, the U.S. has indicated that it would use nuclear weapons or make a pre-emptive strike against North Korea. The Bush Administration's request for an immediate inspection goes against the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. We demand that the U.S. return to its Agreed Framework and revoke its hostile policy toward North Korea. Also, there is no doubt to us that the U.S. itself is obliged to eliminate its nuclear arsenal under the NPT.
3. That both the Japanese and the North Korean governments bring the concept of a 'Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone' to the negotiating table. The issue at hand cannot be resolved by the U.S. style of belligerent diplomacy. We entreat the Japanese and North Korean governments to engage in a faithful and trustworthy dialogue from the standpoint of establishing peace and security. We strongly believe that the very solution to this issue is to be found in the argument for the de-nuclearization of the entire Northeast Asia region. The establishment of a 'Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone' should be brought up in the normalization talks between the two governments. The establishment of such a zone is one concrete way to implement the ideas agreed upon in the Pyongyang Declaration, and is the first step towards a common security in the region built upon mutual trust.
As a country which suffered the terrible experience of the atomic bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the victims of which continue to suffer to this day both
in Japan and on the Korean Peninsula, we call upon the Japanese government to
take the initiative towards a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. To this
date, we have jointly organized with South Korean NGOs the 'Conference for Peace
and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia', as well as engaged in
continuing dialogue with the North Korean 'Korean Anti-Nuke and Peace
Committee'. We wish to take this opportunity to develop a powerful movement and
will continue to tackle this issue in conjunction with South Korean NGOs and
related North Korean organizations.
Umebayashi Hiromichi, Executive Director, Peace Depot (NPO)
Maeda Tetsuo,
Military Affairs Journalist
Kushibuchi Mari, Executive Committee, Peace Boat
(NGO)
November 7, 2002
Recent Developments
(December 12, 2002 - March 19, 2003)12/12
-
DPRK announces that because of US-led decision to suspend oil shipments,
it will restart its 5MW reactor at Yongbyon and resume construction of larger
reactors frozen under 1994 Agreed Framework; DPRK writes IAEA to take steps to
remove seals and monitoring devices from DPRK nuclear facilities at "earliest
possible date"
-
Roh Moo-Hyun wins ROK presidential election; former human rights lawyer
claims he is not anti-US, but will not "kowtow" to US; supports continuing
President Kim Dae-Jung's "Sunshine Policy" with DPRK
-
DPRK removes seals, and covers up monitoring camera at the 5MW reactor at
Yongbyon
-
DPRK removes seals of the storage containers of 8000 used fuel rods
-
DPRK removes seals of four facilities, including the reprocessing facility
and fuel manufacturing facility
-
DPRK sends letter to IAEA informing them of its decision to expel IAEA
inspectors from the country
-
DPRK tells 2 IAEA inspectors to leave country
-
IAEA announces that DPRK informed the IAEA on 12/27 that it would begin
re-operation of reprocessing plant in 1-2 months
-
IAEA inspectors leave DPRK
-
Although it decides against reporting DPRK's actions to UN Security
Council, IAEA adopts "zero tolerance" approach to DPRK's nuclear program,
asking it to admit inspectors and abandon nuclear weapon program; gave no
deadline, but if no compliance by DPRK, will turn issue over to UN Security
Council.
-
Meeting of the Japan-ROK-US Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group.
Joint Statement says that DPRK's relations with the entire international
community depend on its taking "prompt and verifiable action" to dismantle its
nuclear weapons. US offers talks with DPRK, but says talks would not be a
negotiation -- "US will not provide quid pro quos to North Korea to live up to
its existing obligations." Later, President Bush reiterates no intention of
invading DPRK & that US would agree to direct talks with DPRK on how it
can meet its obligations, but other US officials said they would have to be
preceded by DPRK's disavowal of nuclear weapons ambitions
-
DPRK announces immediate withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), but said it may reverse its decision if the US agrees to resume
oil supplies; pledges no intention of producing nuclear weapons and says it
could allow US to "verify" that it had not produced weapons if US drops its
"hostile policy"
-
DPRK threatens to abandon moratorium on ballistic missile tests saying,
"Because all agreements have been nullified by the United States side, we
believe we cannot go along with a self-imposed missile moratorium any
longer."
-
President Bush offers to consider agricultural and fuel aid if North
Korean dismantles its nuclear weapons program
-
DPRK foreign ministry statement rejects Bush's offer as "pie in the sky"
and "nothing but a deceptive drama to mislead world public opinion."
Reiterates it is ready to resolve the nuclear issue through bilateral
negotiations "on the condition that the US recognzie the DPRK's sovereignty,
assures it of non-aggression and does not obstruct its economic
development."
-
ROK President-elect encourages the US to negotiate directly with
DPRK
-
RF Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov begins talks with DPRK
proposing a 3-part "package plan" including 1) nuclear-free status for the
Korean Peninsula, 2) security guarantee, 3) humanitarian & economic aid;
US Under Secretary of State John Bolton says US wants to bring the DPRK
nuclear issue before the UN Security Council and that the US could provide
some sort of guarantee it wouldn't attack the DPRK -- "certainly we can find
ways to record that fact."
-
3-day DPRK-ROK joint cabinet-level meeting -- highest level of
inter-Korean dialogue since nuclear crisis began in October 2002. Although
joint statement says, "North and South Korea have exchanged enough of each
others' positions on the nuclear issue and agreed to actively cooperate to
settle this problem in a peaceful way," South Korea failed to convince DPRK to
issue a public statement committing to quickly abandon its nuclear
program.
-
ROK President-elect announces plans to propose a summit with Kim Jong-Il
soon after being sworn into office on February 25.
-
Reported that USS Kitty Hawk left US Navy base at Yokosuka (Japan) to
monitor Korean Peninsula, though Navy would not confirm reason for its
deployment stating only that it was ready for "any mission." [In February, the
Kitty Hawk is redeployed to the Persian Gulf.]
-
Japan's Defense Minister, Shigeru Ishiba says Japan would be entitled to
strike a DPRK missile base to prevent an attack. Foreign Minister Yoriko
Kawaguchi cited remarks made in 1959 by Defense Agency Chief Shigejiro Ino
that striking missile bases would be within the legal framework of
self-defense. Both ministers were later criticized by DPJ Secretary General
Katsuya Okada for their remarks which identified a specific country, saying
that they would only serve to heighten tensions with DPRK at a sensitive time
and amid ongoing talks over its nuclear programs.
-
DPRK accuses US of planning a massive attack on the DPRK - "The situation
on the Korean Peninsula is deteriorating so rapidly that an armed clash may
break out quite contrary to the desire of the DPRK for a peaceful settlement
of the nuclear issue."
-
DPRK describes Bush "State of the Union" address as an "undisguised
declaration of aggression to topple our system."
-
US Sec. of Defense Donald Rumsfeld places 24 long-range bombers (12 B-52s
and 12 B-1s) on alert for possible deployment to Guam so as to be in easy
range of North Korea to "deter opportunism." Presidential spokesperson, Ari
Fleischer, says US is "making certain our contingencies are viable." On 2/6
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, said the deployment is simply
reinforcing "US deterrent posture to make sure that North Korea doesn't do
anything adventurous or dangerous of a military kind."
-
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage says, "Of course we are going
to have direct talks with the North Koreans, there's no question about it."
Concedes that the US had been "slow off the mark" in dealing with the issue
because of the change of government in ROK. Reiterates US desire to see the
issue solved multilaterally rather than just a problem between the US and
North Korea. Armitage also rules out US acceptance of DPRK's demand for
negotiations leading to a non-aggression treaty, noting that such a treaty
requires Senate ratification of 2/3s majority, of which he says there is "zero
chance."
-
DPRK announces that it has restarted or is poised to restart* its nuclear
facilities and is going ahead with their operation on a "normal footing" to
generate electricity "at the present stage." It says, "The DPRK has already
solemnly declared that its nuclear activity would be limited to peaceful
purposes. [*Various interpretations of the DPRK's "process to restart" has led
to lack of clarity whether the DPRK has actually restarted the reactor or is
the in the process of restarting the reactor at this date.]
-
DPRK warns that US pre-emptive attack on its nuclear facilities would
provoke "total war;" US retorts, criticizing DPRK for talking about war over
its nuclear capabilities and warns that the US has "robust plans for any
contingencies"
-
US Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker warns of possible DPRK missile tests
over Japan, but provides no specifics
-
IAEA governing board finds DPRK in breach of international nuclear weapons
agreements & sends issue to the UN Security Council; should this lead to
sanctions, DPRK says it would consider it a "declaration of war"
-
CIA Director George Tenet claims DPRK has an untested ballistic missile
capable of hitting the US West Coast
-
Japan issues warning that it will launch a pre-emptive strike against the
DPRK if it obtains firm evidence that the North is planning a missile attack
on Japan. Japan's Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba said that Japan could regard
the process of injecting fuel into a missile as the start of a military attack
if it determined that a missile was pointed at Japan; also said Japan should
pursue missile defense
-
ROK President-elect says he would not go along with the US in a military
attack against DPRK to halt its nuclear program
-
US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld expresses support for shifting US forces in
ROK away from the DMZ & Seoul, and possible reduction of 37,000 US troops
on Peninsula
-
Nihon Keizai Shimbun reports that the US and Japan will begin
testing a ship-based missile-defense system in 2004 using a missile-testing
range in Hawaii
-
Though the US claims it has no immediate plans to push for sanctions
against DPRK, the New York Times reports that US State Department and
Pentagon are developing detailed plans for such sanctions
-
Reported that US & ROK will conduct wargames: Exercise Reception,
Staging Onward Movement & Integration (ROSI) 3/19-26 and Foal Eagle, the
largest joint US-ROK field training exercise 3/4 - 4/2, 2003; DPRK invited to
observe
-
ROK President Kim Dae Jung says that he has concluded that the danger of
war on the Korean Peninsula is "slight -- in fact, non-existent," and repeats
his call for prompt US-North Korean talks, saying they are "the only way to
solve this problem."
-
DPRK threatens to abandon its commitment to the 1953 Armistice Agreement
that ended the Korean War should the US impose sanctions
-
ROK President-elect Roh Moo-Hyun states that he is in opposition to the
United States consideration of a military attack on North Korea. "There are
many people who advise me to never display any opinions in opposition to the
United States, but I am planning to say otherwise if it is for the peace of
the Korean Peninsula..."
-
Reported that US Secretary of State Colin Powell is expected to travel to
Japan, China and South Korea for talks on North Korea's suspected nuclear
weapons program
-
DPRK fighter jet briefly crosses western sea border with ROK; ROK places
an anti-aircraft missile unit on battle alert & scrambles fighter jets to
intercept; first DPRK military jet incursion since 1983
-
Outgoing ROK President Kim Dae-Jung urges US to hold one-on-one talks with
DPRK; Australia concurs that direct talks are only realistic option; US
extends tours of duty for 2800 soldiers in Korea; DPRK fires short-range
anti-ship cruise missile into Sea of Japan -- missile test does not violate
the Pyongyang Agreement, and Japan Defense Agency says it "does not pose a
threat to Japan's security;" PRC rejects Powell's appeal for regional approach
to DPRK, calling for direct talks; DPRK successfully blocks 115 other
countries of the Non-Aligned Movement from urging DPRK to return to NPT
-
US announces food aid to DPRK in response to World Food Program Agency
appeal for 2003; Roh Moo-Hyun inaugurated as ROK president
-
US claims that DPRK restarts nuclear reactor frozen in 1994 that could
produce plutonium, but does not appear to have restarted a plant capable of
reprocessing spent fuel rods
-
IAEA states opposition to DPRK operating a nuclear reactor without the
presence of UN safeguard inspectors; FOAL EAGLE officially announced to take
place 3/4 - 4/2 - large scale annual joint military exercise designed to
improve ROK's defensive capabilities against "external aggression"
-
NY Times reports that Pentagon is making contingency plans for possible
military strike against nuclear sites in DPRK
-
DPRK fighter jets intercept US reconnaissance plane over Sea of Japan
following DPRK complaints that reconnaissance planes had intruded in its
airspace over the previous week; first such incident since 1969
-
US deploys 24 B1 & B52 bombers to Guam as "deterrent" to DPRK
-
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld indicates he wants US troops
stationed on the DMZ to be pulled back, shifted south of the border, moved to
other countries in the region, or brought home; Senator Richard Lugar
(Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) calls for US to resume
bilateral dialogue with DPRK in order to manage "the potential for
miscalculation that could lead to a deadly incident or border conflict."
-
ROK's defense minister urges US to leave its troops in place until current
crisis is over
-
DPRK test fires cruise missile into Sea of Japan
-
Asst. Sec of State James Kelly says US-DPRK negotiations will not take
place until DPRK agrees to eliminate nuclear weapons programs, protect human
rights, address US concerns about terrorism, cease the export of missiles,
& reduce conventional forces that target ROK; 6 US stealth fighters arrive
at Kunsan Air Base (ROK), reportedly to participate in Foal Eagle; the planes
have not participated in the exercise for 10 years suggesting that they may be
meant to send a message to the DPRK
-
Aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson Battle Group arrives in Pusan, ROK, in
conjunction with commencement of Foal Eagle wargame; while the carrier has
historically participated in Foal Eagle, this will be the first time in 4
years it has made a port visit to the ROK
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda says Japan may abandon the bilateral Pyongyang Declaration if Pyongyang continues its missile tests and nuclear program, saying that DPRK's recent tests breached the "spirit" of the agreement
Jumping Hoops |
North Korea - "Hermit" Kingdom?
|
Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration
by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chairman Kim Jong-Il of the DPRK National Defense Commission met and had talks in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002. Both leaders confirmed the shared recognition that establishing a fruitful political, economic and cultural relationship between Japan and the DPRK through the settlement of the unfortunate past between them and the outstanding issues of concern would be consistent with the fundamental interests of both sides, and would greatly contribute to the peace and stability of the region. 1. Both sides determined that, pursuant to the spirit and basic principles laid out in this Declaration, they would make every possible effort for an early normalization of the relations, and decided that they would resume the Japan DPRK normalization talks in October 2002. Both sides expressed their strong determination that they would sincerely tackle outstanding problems between Japan and the DPRK based upon their mutual trust in the course of achieving the normalization. 2. The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past, and expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology. Both sides shared the recognition that, providing economic co-operation after the normalization by the Japanese side to the DPRK side, including grant aids, long-term loans with low interest rates and such assistance as humanitarian aid through international organizations, over a period of time deemed appropriate by both sides, and providing other loans and credits by such financial institutions as the Japan Bank for International Co-operation with a view to supporting private economic activities, would be consistent with the spirit of this Declaration, and decided that they would sincerely discuss the specific levels and nature of such economic co-operation in the normalization talks. Both sides, pursuant to the basic principle that when the bilateral relationship is normalized both Japan and the DPRK would mutually waive all their property and claims and those of their nationals that had arisen from causes which occurred before August 15, 1945, decided that they would discuss this issue of property and claims concretely in the normalization talks. Both sides decided that they would sincerely discuss the issue of the status of Korean residents in Japan and the issue of cultural property. 3. Both sides confirmed that they would comply with international law and would not commit conducts threatening the security of the other side. With respect to the outstanding issues of concern related to the lives and security of Japanese nationals, the DPRK side confirmed that it would take appropriate measures so that these regrettable incidents, that took place under the abnormal bilateral relationship, would never happen in the future. 4. Both sides confirmed that they would co-operate with each other in order to maintain and strengthen the peace and stability of North East Asia. Both sides confirmed the importance of establishing co-operative relationships based upon mutual trust among countries concerned in this region, and shared the recognition that it is important to have a framework in place in order for these regional countries to promote confidence-building, as the relationships among these countries are normalized. Both sides confirmed that, for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements. Both sides also confirmed the necessity of resolving security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting dialogues among countries concerned. The DPRK side expressed its intention that, pursuant to the spirit of this Declaration, it would further maintain the moratorium on missile launching in and after 2003. Both sides decided that they would discuss issues relating to security. Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi & Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission, Kim Jong-Il -- September 17, 2002 -- Pyongyang
Notes:
(1) Han Sung Joo, "Current Developments on the Korean Peninsula: Are There Grounds for Hope?," speech UBC October 30, 2002, published by Northeast Asia Peace & Security Network, Special Report, 11/5/02; (2) Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "The Kelly Process, Kim Jong Il's Grand Strategy, and the Dawn of a Post-Agreed Framework Era on the Korean Peninsula," Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, Special Report, 10/22/02; (3) Choe Kin Su, North Korean Ambassador to PRC, Reuters, 11/01/02
Pacific Campaign for Disarmament & Security